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U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA:
AN UNSUCCESSFUL AND SANCTIMONIOUS POLICY
RIPE FOR MODIFICATION
Karen M. Takishita t
Abstract: The United States designated North Korea as a state supporter of
terrorism under the Export Administration Act of 1979, after the North Korean bombing
of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. As a result, the United States imposed tough
economic sanctions against North Korea. Today, North Korea retains the designation of
a state supporter of terrorism as a result of its weapons trade, even though it is not known
to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987. The United States' designation of a state
as a supporter of terrorism is arbitrary as no standard is set out in the U.S. Code. The test
of a terrorist state is not whether the state has supported terrorism or traded in weapons of
mass destruction, but is based on a state's willingness to participate in the U.S.-led war
on terrorism. This criterion is improper, and therefore North Korea should not be
designated as a state supporter of terrorism and be subject to economic sanctions imposed
under the Export Administration Act. In addition, economic sanctions against North
Korea do not fulfill U.S. foreign policy goals. Due to its internal characteristics, North
Korea is not an ideal target for the imposition of economic sanctions, and the United
States' economic sanctions have been of limited effectiveness in influencing North
Korea's behavior in recent crisis situations. Just as the Nixon administration indicated its
interest in improving relations with China through diplomatic steps in the 1970s, the
United States could similarly signal its intention to improve relations with North Korea
by ending unjustified economic sanctions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 1987, a man and a woman disembarked from Korean
2Airlines' Flight 858 in Abu Dhabi and were stopped by security guards.
They immediately bit into cyanide-laced cigarettes, but the woman, Kim
Hyun Hee, survived.3 Meanwhile, Flight 858 exploded in mid-air, killing all
115 people on board. 4 Kim confessed that she and her partner were
intelligence agents of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("North
Korea"), who planted the bomb that caused the plane's explosion.5 They
t The author would like to thank family and friends for their encouragement; Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal editorial staff, especially Rebecca Povarchuk, for their support; and Professors Chae-Jin Lee
and Jane Winn for their guidance.
Korean Airlines is headquartered in South Korea. See KOREAN AIRLINES, MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION, at http://www.koreanair.comlocal/na/eng/gd/ak/ci/akcorpinfomanage.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2005).
2 JAMES LILLEY & JEFFREY LILLEY, CHINA HANDS: NINE DECADES OF ADVENTURE, ESPIONAGE,
AND DIPLOMACY IN ASIA 282-84 (2004).
' Id. at 283.
4 Id. at 282.
Id. at 284.
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were attempting to destabilize the Republic of Korea ("South Korea") during
its presidential election campaign, and to interfere with South Korea's
hosting of the 1988 Olympics. 6 International condemnation for this North
Korean action was swift. The United States subsequently designated North
Korea a state supporter of terrorism under the Export Administration Act of
1979 ("EAA") 7 and subjected it to stringent trade controls.
Since the bombing of Flight 858, however, North Korea is not known
8
to have sponsored any terrorist activities. Nevertheless, the U.S. Secretary
of State continues to list it as a state supporter of repeated terrorism pursuant
to section 6(j) of the EAA. The EAA contains no definition of "terrorism"
and definitions elsewhere in the U.S. Code are varied and vague.9
According to the U.S. Department of State ("State Department"), North
Korea's continued presence on the list is tied to its participation in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ("WMD").'0 Using such a
standard results in uneven application of the law, however, because other
producers of weapons are not designated as state supporters of terrorism."
The Secretary of State's actual standard for determining whether or not a
country is a terrorist state is whether it cooperates in the United States' war
on terror, and because North Korea has not actively supported U.S. efforts, it
is still listed as a state supporter of terrorism.'
Such a standard uses an arbitrary and expansive meaning of
"terrorism." Additionally, the listing of North Korea as a state supporter of
terrorism and the subsequent strict trade controls fail to achieve U.S. foreign
policy goals. Given that the EAA purports to impose export controls in
furtherance of American policy goals,1 3 and no such goals are served with
North Korea's terrorist designation, North Korea should be de-classified as a
state supporter of terrorism.
Part II of this Comment gives a brief overview of North Korea's
relevant history. Part III explores the policy and law that support the
6 d at 282-85.
7 Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-72, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2410, 2410a-2410c,
2411-2420 (2000).
8 See BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE:
NORTH KOREA (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005)
[hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTE: NORTH KOREA].
' See infra Part III.C.2. It should be noted that the 1979 statute has been upheld despite
constitutional challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding the
constitutionality of the EAA despite its preclusion of judicial review); Trane Co. v. Baldrige, 552 F.Supp.
1378 (D.Wis. 1983) (holding that the EAA did not violate the First, Fifth, or Ninth Amendments).
'0 See infra Part 1II.C.2.
See infra Part III.C.2.
1 See infra Part III.C.
13 See Export Administration Act of 1979 § 6, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b)(1) (2000).
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imposition of economic sanctions, examines North Korea's initial listing as a
state supporter of terrorism under the EAA, and challenges the validity of its
continued designation. Part IV argues not only that the economic sanctions
by virtue of North Korea's designation as a supporter of terrorism are
unjustified on policy grounds, but also that they should be discontinued
because of their limited effectiveness. Finally, Part V suggests that the
Nixon administration's decision to open relations with China could provide
a useful model for improving relations with North Korea.
II. NORTH KOREA' S HISTORY DEMONSTRATES A PATTERN OF AGGRESSION
In its nearly sixty-year history, North Korea has repeatedly threatened
and attacked its neighbors, most notably South Korea. North Korea not only
instigated a full-scale war against South Korea in 1950, but has also engaged
in numerous terrorist activities. 14 Additionally, its weapons proliferationprograms have elicited widespread concern. 5
A. North Korea's Attack Against South Korea Shows Its Early Belligerent
Tendencies
North Korea's founding has its roots in the Cold War and power
politics. With the acquiescence of the United States, 16 Japan occupied the
Korean peninsula from 1905 until its defeat in World War 11.17 In 1945, due
to competing U.S. and Soviet interests, the peninsula was split along the
thirty-eighth parallel. 18 The northern half became the communist, Soviet-
allied North Korea, while the southern half became the Western-oriented,
United States-allied Republic of Korea ("South Korea").' 9 Kim I1 Sung, a
well-known anti-Japanese guerilla fighter, became the "Great Leader" of
North Korea and implemented a highly centralized communist government 2°
with juche ("self-reliance") ideology at its center.2'
14 See infra Part II.A & Part IV.C.
15 See infra Part IV.C & Part IV.D.1.16 See Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905, reprinted in John Gilbert Reid, ed., Taft's Telegram to Root
9 PAC. HIST. REV. 66, 69-70 (1940).
17 BACKGROUND NOTE: NORTH KOREA, supra note 8.
18 Id.
'9 See U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK, NORTH KOREA (2004), available
at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.htm (last updated Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter
WoRLD FACTBOOK: NORTH KOREA].
20 BACKGROUND NOTE: NORTH KOREA, supra note 8.
21 For a brief discussion ofjuche, see infra Part IV.B.
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North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, with a surprise
attack and overran much of the country until the United Nations ("UN") sent
a multinational force to South Korea's aid under the aegis of the United
States. 22  Although armistice negotiations began in July 1951, hostilities
continued until 1953,23 when the fighting parties signed an armistice
agreement at Panmunjom. 24 However, hostilities still persist on the peninsula
because no comprehensive peace agreement has replaced the 1953 armistice
pact.25
B. As North Korea Moved from Relative Prosperity to Increased
Isolation and Economic Downturn, Terrorism, Rather Than Full-Scale
War, Became Its Primary Intimidation Tactic
The post-Korean War period was an era of North Korean nation-
building and strategic acts of hostility. From 1953 until about 1974, while
South Korea was plagued by economic and democratic development
problems,26 North Korea's economic output and development outpaced that
of its southern counterpart.27 In this time of relative prosperity, North Korea
benefited from its alliances with China and the Soviet Union, receiving
economic and military development assistance28 and nuclear technology.29
During this period, North Korea also engaged in significant hostile
acts, primarily aimed at South Korea. 30 From 1954 to 1992, 3693 armed
agents from North Korea infiltrated South Korea.31 In February 1958, North
Korean agents hijacked a South Korean flight and kept passengers, including
22 CHAE-JIN LEE, CHINA AND KOREA: DYNAMIC RELATIONS 12 (1996). The multinational force was
called the United Nations Command. Id.
23 See BACKGROUND NOTE: NORTH KOREA, supra note 8.
24 Korean Armistice Agreement, 4.1. U.S.T. 234 (1953).
25 See BACKGROUND NOTE: NORTH KOREA, supra note 8.
26 See, e.g., JOHN KiE-CHIANG OH, KOREAN POLITICS: THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRATIZATION AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 24-89 (1999) (reporting that South Korea went through much domestic turmoil
surrounding the undemocratic and repressive regimes of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, and Chun Doo
Hwan).
27 When Korea was divided in 1945, the North was more economically developed and its gross
domestic product ("GDP") was larger. See MARCUS NOLAND, AVOIDING THE APOCALYPSE: THE FUTURE
OFTHE TWO KOREAS 59-60 (2000) [hereinafter AVOIDING THE APOCALYPSE].
2 See id. at 145.
29 See Seung-Ho Joo, Russia and Korea, in THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE MAJOR POWERS 105-
06 (Bae Ho Hahn & Chae-Jin Lee eds., 1998).
30 There were hostile acts against the United States as well, but these usually centered around the
Demilitarized Zone and do not appear to reflect a North Korean policy of terrorism against the United
States. See DICK K. NANTO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NORTH KOREA: CHRONOLOGY OF
PROVOCATIONS, 1950-2003 (2003).
31 Id. Nanto also notes that North Korean provocations were most intense in the latter half of the
1960s. Id.
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one American, hostage for weeks before releasing most of them.3 2 A North
Korean squad nearly attacked the residence of the South Korean President
before being repelled by South Korean police in January 1968.33 Two days
later,34 North Korea fired upon the U.S. ship USS Pueblo while it was in
international waters and held the crew captive for nearly a year until a
diplomatic solution was reached.35 North Korea's assassination attempts
included efforts to kill South Korean President Park Chung Hee in 1968 and
1974,36 and South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in a bombing incident
in Rangoon, Myanmar (Burma) in 1983. 37 North Korea also bombed
Korean Airlines Flight 858 in 1987-its last known sponsored act of
terrorism.
38
Beginning in the 1970s, North Korea suffered an economic
downturn, 39 just as South Korea's economy began to rapidly develop.40 As
the North Korean economy slowed down, its Gross National Product fell,41
and the country encountered great economic difficulties. North Korea's
economic situation has remained bleak while its international terrorist
activities have abated.
C. From 1992 to the Present, Internal Humanitarian Crises and
International Opposition to Its Weapons Programs Have Dominated
North Korea s International Affairs
Since 1992, North Korea's international relations have been dominated
by its need for food and oil aid to prevent overwhelming starvation,42 and
U.S.-led opposition to its weapons programs. North Korea has suffered from
32 See id. at 3.
33 See MITCHELL B. LERNER, THE PUEBLO INCIDENT: A SPY SHIP AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 60 (2002). Thirty-one North Korean army officers disguised as South Korean soldiers
reached the South Korean presidential residence, and prepared to launch their assassination attempt against
South Korean President Park Chung Hee when a South Korean policeman stopped them. The North
Koreans either fled or were killed in the ensuing gunfight. Id.
34 NANTO, supra note 30, at 4.
35 LERNER, supra note 33, at 2. One man and several others were wounded in the attack. Id. at 81.
The crew was also tortured in North Korean custody. Id. at 170-79. Additionally, North Korea shot down
an American reconnaissance plane on April 14, 1969, over the Sea of Japan. Id. at 233.
36 NANTO, supra note 30, at 4, 6.
37 Id. at 8.
38 BACKGROUND NOTE: NORTH KOREA supra note 8.
39 The North Korean economy started to decline from the early 1970s. See AVOIDING THE
APOCALYPSE, supra note 27, at 4.
40 See id. The decline may primarily be attributed to North Korea's inability to raise the productivity
of existing assets. Id.
41 See JANG C. JIN, Openness and Growth in North Korea: Evidence from Time Series Data, in
NORTH KOREA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 201-02 (E. Kwan Choi, et. al. eds., 2003).
42 See UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, World Hunger - Korea(DPR), available at
http://www.wfp.org/ country-brief/indexcountry.asp?country=408 (last updated July 23, 2004).
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severe food shortages due to natural disasters, an economic downturn, 43 the
collapse of the Soviet Union, 44 and policies placing greater importance on
military spending than civilian welfare.45 Although they have opposed North
Korea's weapons programs, the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea
have continued to send humanitarian aid to North Korea.46 North Korea
threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT")
in 1993, touching off an international crisis that was temporarily resolved
with the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994.47 North Korea's domestic and
international concerns continue to center around its weapons programs and
need for foreign aid. Opposition to North Korea's nuclear weapons program
also remains, as this crisis has yet to be resolved after North Korea's
withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003 .48
Il. JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. POLICY TowARD NORTH KOREA Is TENUOUS
BECAUSE NORTH KOREA HAS NOT SPONSORED TERRORIST ACTS FOR
MANY YEARS
Economic sanctions are commonly used to signal resolve and exert
pressure for policy changes because they are a less risky means of imposing
costs on a target state than military action.49 Sanctions satisfy the domestic
political need for government action and reinforce commitment to a
behavioral norm.5° In situations where the American public is reluctant to
use force, sanctions provide a visible and less expensive alternative to
military intervention, while also providing an alternative to doing nothing or
mere rhetoric.
Economic sanctions are commonly defined as the deliberate,
government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade
or financial relations that would probably have occurred in their absence.52
41 See id.
4 The amount of trade between North Korea and the Soviet Union, historically North Korea's
principal patron, declined significantly as relations worsened and the Soviet economy imploded. See
AVOIDING THE APOCALYPSE, supra note 27, at 95-99.
'5 See WORLD FACTBOOK: NORTH KOREA, supra note 19.
4 See infra Part IV.C, IV.D. The United States provided nearly two million tons of humanitarian
food aid to North Korea between 1996 and 2003. See BACKGROUND NOTE: NORTH KOREA, supra note 8.
47 See infra Part IV.C.
48 See infra Part IV.D.
49 LISA L. MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 3
(1992).
50 RICHARD N. HAASs, Introduction to ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 2
(Richard N. Haass ed., 1998).
51 id.
52 GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT
POUCY 2 (1990).
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They "seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by
reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to
change its political behavior.' 53 Legislation such as the Trading with the
Enemy Act, 54 International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
55 EAA, 56
Export-Import Bank Act,57 and Arms Export Control Act58 provide the basis
for many of the sanctions imposed by the United States. The power to
impose or amend sanctions is within the purview of the executive branch.59
The United States puts forth four justifications for its current
economic sanctions against North Korea:
1. North Korea poses a threat to U.S. national security, as
determined by the President and reviewed annually under
the terms of the Trading with the Enemy Act and the
National Emergencies Act;
2. North Korea is designated by the Secretary of State as a
state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism,
pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979;
3. North Korea is a Marxist-Leninist state, with a
Communist government, classified as such in the Export-
Import Bank Act of 1945, and further restricted from
access to economic assistance under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961; and
4. North Korea had been found by the State Department to
have engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act,
Export Administration Act of 1979, and Iran
Proliferation Act of 2000.60
53 Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT'L SEC. 90, 93-94 (1997).
54 Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-14, 16-39,41-44 (2000); 12 U.S.C.
§ 95a (2000).
55 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1706
(2000).
56 Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2410, 2410a-
2410c, 2411-2420 (2000).
57 Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 526 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
58 Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C.).
59 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
60 DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NORTH KOREA: ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS 1 (2003).
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In 1999, President Clinton announced the easing of banking, trade,
and travel sanctions against North Korea in order to improve relations,
support the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, and encourage North Korea to
continue to refrain from testing long-range missiles. 61 Since this
announcement, U.S. sanctions policy towards North Korea has not
significantly changed, and the Bush administration has given little indication
that it will further ease sanctions.62
A. The EAA Limits International Trade Due to National Security and
Foreign Policy Concerns
The most significant legal justification for sanctions against North
Korea is the Export Administration Act of 1979,63 which regulates dual-use
items.64 Section 6(j) of the EAA prohibits U.S. trade in dual-use goods with
countries the State Department has listed as state supporters of international
terrorism. 65 Additionally, a section 6(j) listing compels the United States to
oppose that country's application for membership in international financial
institutions.66 North Korea has expressed interest in joining the Asian
Development Bank,67 the World Bank, and the International Monetary
Fund.68 Such membership could greatly contribute to liberalizing North
Korea's economy and possibly bring about a fall of the current regime.69
However, the United States will not support North Korea's membership in
61 OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NORTH KOREA: WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SANCTIONS (2000), at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/
t IIkorea.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
62 See infra Part II1.C.
63 This is particularly so after President Clinton's steps to end the total trade embargo against North
Korea in 1999, and to ameliorate the Trading with the Enemy Act's effect. However, Clinton's policy did
not affect anti-terrorism or nonproliferation export controls. See RENNACK, supra note 60, at 6.
64 Dual-use items are goods, technologies, and services with both military and commercial
application. H.R. Rep. 107-297 (II) 7 (2002).
65 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(6)(j) (2000).
6 See International Financial Institutions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 262d (2000).
67 North Korea indicated its interest in joining the Asian Development Bank in August 2000. See
Asian Development Bank, Press Conference: President Meets the Press, 33 ADB REVIEw (2001), at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ADB-Review/2001/vo133-3/presscon.asp (last visited Apr. 20,
2005). Consensus has not been reached regarding North Korea's membership, and its application has not
been processed. See Asian Development Bank, Press Conference: President Meets the Press, 36 ADB
REVIEW (2004), at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ADB-Review/2004/vo136-4/press-
conference.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
68 North Korea has periodically expressed interest in joining the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund ("IMF'), but membership talks have not progressed, due in part to North Korea's
unwillingness to provide access to economic data and to the opposition of influential countries such as the
United States and Japan. See MARCUS NOLAND, KOREA AFTER KIM JONG-IL 58 (2004).
69 North Korea has recognized the prospect that market liberalization could lead to the communist
regime's fall. See Nicholas Eberstadt, The Persistence of North Korea, 127 POLICY REVEW 23, 39 (2004).
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these institutions so long as North Korea remains on the state sponsors of
terrorism list.
First enacted in 1969, the EAA authorized government control over
exports for three reasons: national security, foreign policy, and short
supply. 70 The legislative history of the 1969 EAA has strong Cold War
overtones, reflecting the United States' goal to "formulate a unified
commercial and trading policy to be observed by the non-Communist-
dominated nations or areas in their dealings with the Communist-dominated
nations.",7' Due to their status as communist states, China and North Korea
72were included as countries which could not import dual-use items.
The 1979 EAA built upon the 1969 version. The Senate noted that
"[t]here are circumstances in which the economic benefits and the
presumption against government interference with participation in
international commerce by U.S. citizens are outweighed by the potential
adverse effect of particular exports on the national security, foreign policy,
or economy of the United States. 73 Thus, the EAA's prevailing purpose
was to prevent exports from making "a significant contribution to the
military potential of any nation which would prove detrimental to United
States national security." 74 To fulfill this policy, the Secretary of State
could, pursuant to section 6(j), impose trade restrictions on countries that he
or she determined were state supporters of international terrorism. 75
76Although the 1979 EAA expired on August 20, 1994, the section 60)
designation framework influences other significant laws pertaining to
economic sanctions.77
70 H.R. 91-524 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2705, 2706.
71 Id.
72 Id. citing section 2(2) of the Export Control Act of 1949.
" S. REP. No. 96-169, at 2 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1147, 1148.
74 Id. at 3.
75 See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(6)0) (2000).
76 S. REP. No. 107-297 (II), supra note 64, at 7. Economic sanctions remain in place pursuant to
presidential authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405
(2000).
77 Section 60) is cross-referenced in several other laws. See, e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (2000)
(prohibiting financial transactions with a section 60) country). Anti-terrorism controls apply against most
countries designated as state supporters of international terrorism--Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
and Syria-but not against Iraq. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 742.1 (2004). It is
generally considered that the list maintained pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979 applies to
the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. RENNACK, supra note 60, at 7 n.15.
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B. North Korea's Initial Listing As a State Supporter of Terrorism Was
Justified Due to Its Substantial Terrorist Activities Prior to 1988
Prior to 1988 North Korea committed significant terrorist acts against
South Korea, including three presidential assassination attempts and the
construction of tunnels into South Korea.' 8 However, no overt terrorist
activities were aimed at the United States.79 Outraged by the 1987 terrorist
bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858, the State Department listed North
Korea as a state supporter of terrorism under the 1979 EAA. 80 The House of
Representatives and Senate unanimously passed resolutions condemning
North Korea's involvement in the bombing and expressing support for North
Korea's inclusion on the list of state supporters of terrorism because of its
past history of terrorist activities. 81 Thus, North Korea's involvement in
terrorist activities justified its initial designation by the Secretary of State as
a state supporter of terrorism.
C. North Korea's Present Listing Is Not Justified Because It Has Not
Provided Support to International Terrorism Since 1987
More than fifteen years after its last known terrorist attack,82 however,
North Korea remains on the list of countries that the Secretary of State has
determined to have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism. ' 83 Based on the Secretary of State's designation as such, North
Korea presently falls under section 6(j) of the EAA and is subject to
economic sanctions. North Korea's designation as a state supporter of
terrorism is not justified simply by terrorist activities that were characteristic
of its past, but is actually based on its weapons trade and refusal to
participate in the U.S.-led war on terror.
78 See NANTO, supra note 30.
79 See id.
80 See NANTO, supra note 30, at 10.
81 134 CONG. REC. H475-02 (1988). 134 CONG. REC. S1029-01 (1988).
82 North Korea is not known to have sponsored any terrorist attacks since the 1987 bombing of
Korean Airlines Flight 858. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OVERVIEW OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM,
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/
31644.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (2004)].
" 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d).
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1. North Korea Has Not Recently Supported Terrorism
North Korea previously engaged in terrorist activities, 84 but has not
sponsored any known terrorist acts since 1987. 85 The North Korean Human
Rights Act of 2004, the most recent piece of U.S. legislation regarding North
Korea, does not include any mention of North Korea's involvement in
terrorist activities.86 Under this law, the United States will provide US $124
million each year over the 2005-08 period to provide support for North
Korean refugees and grants for private, nonprofit organizations to promote
human rights, democracy, rule of law, and the development of a market
economy in North Korea.8 7 Omission of North Korea's prior involvement in
international terrorism may indicate that North Korea generally is no longer
thought of as a terrorist state, although it may be an "evil" one.
8s
Prior to September 11, 2001, there were serious discussions within the
State Department about taking North Korea off the list of designated state
supporters of terrorism.8 9 In October 2000, the United States and North
Korea jointly stated that North Korea accepted the three conditions the
United States demanded for removing North Korea from the list of state
supporters of terrorism. 90 The three conditions consisted of: (1) North
Korea's opposition to terrorism and a commitment not to support it; (2)
participation in all international anti-terrorism conventions; and (3) resolving
the issue of kidnapped Japanese nationals and North Korea's harboring of
the Japanese Communist League-Red Army guerrilla members who hijacked
a Japan Airlines flight in 1970.91
Despite these improvements, the State Department again listed North
Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in 2001. Although North Korea has
stated its opposition to terrorism, the State Department noted that North
Korea harbors Japanese communist hijackers, and the Philippine government
84 See NANTO, supra note 30.
85 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (2004), supra note 82.
'6 H.R. 4011 (2004).
87 Id. North Korea has denounced the North Korean Human Rights Act as a hostile policy that seeks
regime change in North Korea under the cover of diplomacy. N.K. Accuses U.S. of Secretly Seeking
Regime Change in Pyongyang, YONHAP ENGLISH NEWS, Nov. 30, 2004, available at 2004 WL 91471854.
88 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
133 (Feb. 4, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2005).
89 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OVERVIEW OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM (Apr. 30, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/slctrlspgtrpt/20002441.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (2001)].
90 Yonhap News Agency, NORTH KOREA HANDBOOK 542 (Monterey Interpretation and Translation
Services trans. 2003).
91 Id.
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stated that terrorist groups have bought weapons from North Korea using
Middle East funding sources.92 According to the State Department, North
Korea "has not taken substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat
international terrorism," 93 despite pledging to do so in the Joint United
States-DPRK Statement on International Terrorism. 94 Consequently, the
State Department has made no mention of removing North Korea from the
list since April 2001 , even though North Korea has not recently supported
terrorist acts.
2. The EAA Does Not Define "Terrorism," and the United States Has
Implemented an Arbitrary and Expansive Definition of Terrorism
Terrorism, broadly defined, is premeditated, politically-motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or
clandestine agents; international terrorism involves the citizens or property
of more than one country. 96 The EAA lacks a definition of "terrorism" or
"international terrorism," merely stating that the Secretary of State
designates terrorist-supporting states. 97 Other legislation, however, includes
varying definitions of terrorism, thus providing no clear and definite
standard that the Secretary may use in making such a determination.
The current definition in the Arms Export Control Act states that
state-supported acts of international terrorism include:
All activities that the Secretary determines willfully aid or abet
the international proliferation of nuclear explosive devices to
individuals or groups, willfully aid or abet an individual or
groups in acquiring unsafeguarded special nuclear material, or
willfully aid or abet the efforts of an individual or group to use,
92 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (2004), supra note 82.
93 id.
94 Joint U.S.-DPRK Statement on International Terrorism (Oct. 6, 2000), available at http://japan.
usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-c 160.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
95 The PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM reports released after April 2001 make no mention of
North Korea moving off the state supporters of terrorism list. See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM
(2001), supra note 89; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ctlrls/pgtrpt/200l/html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2002, available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrptl2002/htmll (last
visited Apr. 20, 2005); PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (2004), supra note 82.
96 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2000); RAPHAEL PERL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TERRORISM
AND NATIONAL SECURITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 4 (2004).
9' See 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050) (2000).
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develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical,
biological, or radiological weapons.
98
This definition is particularly pertinent because like the EAA, under
the Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State determines whether a
state has supported "international terrorism." 99 Additionally, this seems to
be the clearest definition of state-supported terrorism available, as American
legislation lacks a precise definition of the term. Further, the U.S. Criminal
Code provides that it is a crime of terrorism to use, threaten, attempt, or
conspire to use a weapon of mass destruction.10
Legally, North Korea's status as a terrorist state appears to be related
to its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its nuclear
program. 01 However, this stretches the definition of terrorism, because it
goes far beyond the traditional understanding of terrorism as politically-
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets. There is no
evidence that North Korea has undertaken, funded, or encouraged
politically-motivated violence against noncombatant targets since 1987.102
Although North Korea's arms trade has been a concern for the United
States,103 it has only recently been tied to North Korea's designation as a
terrorist supporting state.
1 °4
Given recent legislation aimed at countering terrorism, particularly
with regard to export controls, it is unlikely that future EAAs will include a
9' 22 U.S.C. § 2780(d) (West 2002).
99 See id.
10o 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (West 2002). The use of WMD is included under the crime of "terrorism." 18
U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2332a-b, 2332d-f, 2333-2339C (West 2002). This section has been amended by the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004),
but its definition remains essentially the same.
'o1 The inclusion of a statement against the proliferation of WMD in PATTERNS'OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM (2004) indicates that producing WMD is tied to a state's status as a supporter of terrorism. See
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (2004), supra note 82. See also PERL, supra note 96, at 3-4 (North
Korea may be termed a less active state-supporter of terrorism, and U.S. security concerns arguably focus
more on the state's WMD than on its support for terrorist activities).
102 North Korea's harboring of a handful of aging Japanese communists is an exception to this
statement. See BACKGROUND NOTE: NORTH KOREA, supra note 8.
t03 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. S1845-01 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1994) (statement of Sen. Bennett) ("The
issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program has been of public interest for over a year"). See also
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Remarks Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing on North Korea (Feb. 4, 2003), reprinted in U.S. Willing to Hold Direct Talks with North Korea,
Armitage Says, DAILY WASHINGTON FILE, available at http://usembassy-australia.state.govlhyper/200
3/
0204/epf2O2.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) (noting that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been
deeply concerned about North Korea's development of WMD).
104 Cf PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (2001), supra note 89; PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM
(2004), supra note 82. Current U.S. policy seeks to "pressure and isolate state sponsors so they will
renounce the use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, and bring terrorists to justice for past crimes."
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (2001), supra note 89.
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narrower definition of terrorism. Efforts at reforming and replacing the
1979 EAA have emphasized national security,'0 5 included a special grant of
presidential authority in situations involving international terrorism, 1°6 and
provided stronger roles for the Departments of State and Defense in making
export control decisions. 107 A strong component of the 2001 Export
Administration Act, passed by the Senate but stalled in the House of
Representatives, was the United States' national security interest in
controlling the export of dual-use goods to impede the proliferation of WMD
and international terrorism.'0 8 The general legislative trend seems to favor
greater export controls against countries with any connection to terrorism.
Tying terrorism to weapons programs, however, is fraught with
difficulties. The United States leads the world in arms transfers,' °9 and its
arms sales are not always in the foreign policy interests of other countries.
l °
Recognizing this dichotomy, North Korea claimed that U.S. opposition to its
weapons program showed its policy of double standards, and labeled the
United States a "nuclear criminal" itself.11' The United States has not listed
France, the United Kingdom, Germany, or Italy as state sponsors of
terrorism, although collectively they delivered US $34,200 million of arms
to Saudi Arabia-the state of origin for most of the September 11
terrorists 1 -between 1995 and 2002.1 13
The actual U.S. standard for determining which states support
terrorism, however, does not turn on the identity of the arms buyer, but on
whether the seller has aided the United States in its "war on terror."
11 4
President George W. Bush has repeatedly proclaimed that "nations are either
'05 See S. REP. NO. 107-10 (2001).
:06 See Export Administration Act of 2003, H.R. 55, 108th Cong. (2003).
07 See H.R. REP. No. 107-297, supra note 64, at 7.
'0' See S. REP. No. 107-10, supra note 105, at 1-2.
109 See RICHARD F. GRIMMETI, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONVENTIONAL ARMS
TRANSFERS To DEVELOPING NATIONS, 1996-2003 6 (2004).
110 For example, China has opposed U.S. sales of military technology to Taiwan as being contrary to
its foreign policy interests. EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, CHINA STRONGLY PROTESTS U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIwAN (Apr. 25, 2001), available at
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/ t36739.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
... See U.S. Urged to Drop Its Policy of Double Standards, KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, Jan.
15, 2005, available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/20050l/newsOl/l7.htm (last visited Apr. 20,
2005).
112 Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi. 9/11 COMMISSION, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 371
(2004).
113 RICHARD F. GRIMMET, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS
TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 1995-2002 59 (2003).
114 George W. Bush, "Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," Address Before a Joint
Session of the Congress on the United States, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 2001).
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with us or against us in the war on terror," 15 indicating that the United
States will judge states as being supporters of terrorism by their lack of
participation in, and support of, the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Such support
seems to absolve states from the sins of their previous terrorist acts and
weapons sales. Although Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998 despite
U.S. opposition," 6 and significantly collaborated in weapons development
with North Korea, 17 it has benefited from significant U.S. economic aid due
to its support of the U.S.-led war on terror." 18  North Korea suffered
sanctions from its sale of missile technology to Yemen," 9 while Yemen did
not. The United States indicated that the sanctions against Yemen were
waived because of nonproliferation "commitments [it] made and in
consideration of [its] support for the war on terrorism."'' 20 Due to North
Korea's continued nuclear and WMD proliferation programs and its mere lip
service in support of the United States' war on terrorism, North Korea
remains a designated state supporter of terrorism.121
IV. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
OBJECTIVES
Under the 1979 EAA, the President can amend export controls based
on their likelihood of achieving the intended foreign policy purpose and
"[compatibility] with the foreign policy objectives of the United States."1 22
Sanctions against North Korea are not successful due to its poor command
economy, the availability of other trading partners, and unique nationalist
juche ideology. Therefore, the United States should move towards less
stringent economic sanctions and other means of achieving its foreign policy
goals.
i'5 See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, President Bush Calls for New
Palestinian Leadership (June 24, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/
20020624-3.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
116 See BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: PAKISTAN
(2004), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter
BACKGROUND NOTE: PAKISTAN].
117 See SHARON A. SQUASSONI, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: TRADE BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND PAKISTAN 6-10 (2004).
i' Americans have been the target of several attacks in Pakistan, including an attack on the American
Center in Islamabad in 1989. See BACKGROUND NOTE: PAKISTAN, supra note 116.
"9 North Korea was sanctioned under the 1979 EAA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401b(b)(1), and the Arms
Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2797b(a)(1) for engaging in missile technology proliferation activities. 67
Fed.Reg. 164 (Aug. 23, 2002).
12 U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pal
prs/dpb/2002/15888.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
121 See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (2004), supra note 82.
122 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b)(1) (2000).
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A. There Are Established Criteria to Evaluate the Effectiveness of
Economic Sanctions
Although the utility and effectiveness of economic sanctions are
widely debated, 123 several common criteria emerge for such an evaluation.
To determine how effective sanctions are, it is important to conduct a
comparative cost-benefit analysis with other alternatives. 124 In order to
maximize the effectiveness of economic sanctions, experts recommend they
be used mostly for modest aims, have multilateral support, emphasize
precision and narrowness, and allow for humanitarian exemptions. 125
Additionally, sanctions tend to be more effective against free market
economies without other available trading partners,126 because states with
planned economies mitigate against the sanctions with adjustments such as
substitution and conservation. 2' Finally, economic sanctions may be termed
successful where: (1) the target state conceded to significant demands made
by the coercer; (2) economic sanctions were threatened or actually applied
before the target changed its behavior; and (3) no more-credible explanation
exists for the target's change of behavior.
128
B. North Korea's Political and Economic Ideologies Render Sanctions
Ineffective
As one of the world's most centrally planned and isolated economies,
North Korea's government controls and sets the economy's means of
production and development. 129 Accordingly, outside economic forces, such
as sanctions, have considerably less influence on North Korea compared to a
free market economy, and have little effect on private citizens.
1 30
North Korea's economic state is dire, and it suffers from poor
infrastructure, a collapsed energy sector, and chronic food shortages. 131
123 Hufbauer made a case for sanctions' ability to achieve foreign policy goals in his influential study
on economic sanctions. See HUFBAUER, supra note 52. One of the prominent criticisms of economic
sanctions and of Hufbauer's study is Robert A. Pape. See Pape, supra note 53.
124 Richard N. Haass, Sanctions as an Instrument of American Foreign Policy, 32 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1, 2-3 (2000).
"5 Id. at 3-6.
'26 MAKIO M1YAGAWA, Do ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK? 26 (1992).
127 Pape, supra note 53, at 107.
121 Id. at 97.
129 WORLD FACTBOOK: NORTH KOREA, supra note 19.
130 MIYAGAWA, supra note 126, at 26.
131 BACKGROUND NOTE: NORTH KOREA, supra note 8. In comparison, South Korea's per capita gross
domestic product ("GDP") is eighteen times that of North Korea's, its annual exports total about US$ 201.3
billion, and its imports are annually US$ 175.6 billion. See U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD
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Considerably smaller than its neighbors, North Korea's economy has fewer
available resources. 132 With its command economy, North Korea's
engagement in international trade is also limited. 33 As a result, its lack of
trade with the United States does not punish North Korea-the world's most
autarkic country.1 34 Because international trade does not constitute a large
part of North Korea's economy, economic sanctions do not significantly hurt
the North Korean economy.
In addition to these factors, North Korea's juche nationalist ideology
makes sanctions even less effective. The country's greatest strength in
resisting external economic pressure lies in its juche ideological solidarity. 135
Unlike Marxist-Leninist ideology that promotes world revolution, juche is
not concerned with revolution. 136 Juche generally means self-reliance;
external dependence is suppressed. 37
Such nationalism often makes states willing to endure punishments
rather than abandon their policies. 138 Indeed, even in weak states, "external
pressure is more likely to enhance the nationalist legitimacy of rulers than to
undermine it." 139 North Korea is no exception, as it has prepared for
economic isolation since its inception, and there is no great domestic
demand for foreign goods. 140 The regime considers luxury harmful to
human development and thus discourages production of commodities and
FACTBOOK, SOUTH KOREA (2004), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ geos/ks.html
(last updated Feb. 10 2005) [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK: SOUTH KOREA].
' North Korea's GDP in 2003 was estimated at US$ 29.58 billion. WORLD FACTBOOK: NORTH
KOREA, supra note 19. South Korea's was US$ 857.8 billion. WORLD FACTBOOK: SOUTH KOREA, supra
note 131. Japan's was US$ 3.582 trillion. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK,
JAPAN (2004), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geosja.htil (last updated Feb. 10,
2005). China's 2003 GDP was an estimated US$ 6.449 trillion. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
WORLD FACTBOOK, CHINA (2004), available at http:/www.cia.govlcia/publications/factbook/geosch.htnml
(last updated Feb. 10, 2005). Russia's was US$ 1.282 trillion. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
WORLD FACTBOOK, RUSSIA (2004), available at http://www.cia.govlcialpublications/factbookgeos/rs.htm
(last updated Feb. 10, 2005).
133 North Korea primarily engages in trade with South Korea, China, and Japan. See WORLD
FACTBOOK: NORTH KOREA, supra note 19.
'34 See AVOIDING THE APOCALYPSE, supra note 27, at 61.
135 See HANS. PARK, NORTH KOREA: THE POLITICS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM 124 (2002).
136 North Korean leader Kim 11 Sung thought that little encouragement would be need for South
Korea to embrace socialism and North Korea's juche ideology. See Victor D. Cha, Assessing the North
Korean Threat, in NORTH KOREA AND NORTHEAST ASIA 228 (Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee eds.,
2002). See also DON OBERDORFER, THE Two KOREAS: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 99 (1997).
137 KOREAN FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION, POLITICS, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, at
http://www.korea-dpr.comipolitics2.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
138 Pape, supra note 53, at 106.
'9 Id. at 106-07.
140 Paul VanWagenen, Note, United States Economic Sanctions - Non-Traditional Success Against
North Korea, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 239, 258 (2000).
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consumer goods. 14 1 Although limited international trade has been accepted
as a necessary evil, 142 North Korea's juche-based policy of economic self-
reliance has largely deterred economic growth and resulted in isolation.
143
Accordingly, North Korea's uniquely self-reliant economy renders economic
sanctions largely ineffective.
C. The Use of Sanctions by the United States in the 1993-1994 Nuclear
Crisis with North Korea Reflects the Limits of Their Effectiveness
North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration of the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on December 31, 1991.144 In
1992, North Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency
("IAEA") Safeguards Agreement allowing international inspections of its
nuclear facilities. 45 IAEA inspections subsequently revealed discrepancies
indicating that North Korea may have stored weapons-grade plutonium in
violation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. 146 When the IAEA requested
permission to conduct more inspections at suspected nuclear waste storage
sites, North Korea refused, viewing the IAEA as "simply a United States
tool, [that] was attempting to place increased pressure on [North Korea]."'
47
When the IAEA called on North Korea to allow IAEA inspections, 148 North
Korea announced that it would back out of the NPT after the obligatory
ninety day notification period-the first withdrawal in the NPT's history.
1 49
Concerned that North Korea's NPT withdrawal might spur other
countries to also withdraw,' 50 the United States sought to enjoin North
Korea's action. 151 As President Clinton stated, North Korea's becoming a
nuclear power would be "a very grave development, not just for South Korea
141 PARK, supra note 135, at 93.
142 Marcus Noland, North Korea's External Economic Relations: Globalization in 'Our Own Style,'
in NORTH KOREA AND NORTHEAST ASIA 165 (Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee eds., 2002).143 PARK, supra note 135, at 23-24.
144 Democratic People's Republic of Korea-Republic of Korea: Joint Declaration on Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula, 33 I.L.M. 569 (1994).
145 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Jan. 30, 1992, DPRK-IAEA, 33 I.L.M. 315
(1994).
146 See OBERDORFER, supra note 136, at 275-76.
147 WiLLIAM E. BERRY, JR., INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE 7 (1995).
141 OBERDORFER, supra note 136, at 279-80.
149 Id. at 280.
150 See, e.g., Henry A. Kissinger, Why We Can't Withdraw from Asia, WASH. POST, June 15, 1993, at
A21 ("Too many concessions to Pyongyang will only encourage other nations to blackmail us by entering
the nuclear field.").
'51 See OBERDORFER, supra note 136, at 285-86.
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but for Japan as well and for all of Asia,"' 52 because it could destabilize the
balance of power in the region.' 53  The Clinton administration pursued
coercive diplomacy that addressed military and economic concerns."' With
Japanese and South Korean input, the United States pursued a carrot-and-
stick policy consisting of "the threat of sanctions plus certain face-saving
inducements [to] help [North Korea] comply," and the added threat of
military action if it proved recalcitrant. '55 This policy was not very
effective, however, as the United States and its allies could not agree on the
incentives to be used.
156
Neither was there agreement over the means to induce North Korea to
comply with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. South Korea, Japan, and
China hesitated to impose sanctions and opposed a U.S. military attack.'57
The United States lobbied Beijing to exert pressure on Pyongyang, playing
on Beijing's reluctance to support sanctions. 158 However, even economic
sanctions were risky because there was the "likelihood that sanctions would
prove politically provocative and economically ineffective."'' 59
The carrot-and-stick approach nearly became moot following North
Korea's announcement that it was removing eight thousand spent fuel rods
from its Yongbyon reactor without IAEA approval. 160  The United States
considered imposing economic sanctions without U.N. Security Council
152 President William J. Clinton, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at Waseda University
in Tokyo, PUB. PAPERS 1019, 1025 (July 7, 1993).
See HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY: TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR THE
21 t CENTURY 132-34 (2001). For example, failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear threat could lead to
the nuclear armament of Japan. See id. at 127.
l-4 See David E. Sanger, Clinton, in Seoul, Tells North Korea to Drop Arms Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 1993, sec. 1, p.l.
155 Statement by South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo in Washington, March 29 1993,
(quoted in Leon V. Sigal, The United States and North Korea: Cooperative Security on the Agreed
Framework and Beyond in HONEY AND VINEGAR: INCENTIVES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY 73
(Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan eds., 2000)). See also OBERDORFER, supra note 136, at 282.
:56 Sigal, supra note 155, at 73.
157 The threat of sanctions posed a particular problem for Japan, as there were approximately 300,000
pro-DPRK Koreans residing in Japan, making contributions to North Korea estimated at US$ 600 million
to US$1.6 billion annually in the form of hard currency sent to relatives, equipment, and spare parts. See
David E. Sanger, Japan Split Over Role in a North Korea Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1994, sec.1,p.3. 158 LEON V. SIGAL, DISARMING STRANGERS: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY WITH NORTH KOREA 58 (1998)
[hereinafter DISARMING STRANGERS].
:59 Sigal, supra note 155, at 76.
60 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards (2003),
available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/fact-sheetmay2003.shtml (last visited Apr.
20, 2005). The removal of fuel rods without IAEA presence violated the NPT and IAEA safeguards
agreement, in pars because spent fuel rods could be used in determining whether North Korea was secretly
extracting plutonium. See id.
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endorsement, 161 but the limited receptiveness of other countries 162 led
Washington to emphasize political pressure in its dealings instead. North
Korea's subsequent withdrawal from the IAEA, however, provoked the
United States to advocate U.N. Security Council sanctions despite North
Korea's warnings that sanctions would amount to a declaration of war."'
The Clinton administration adopted a policy of gradual sanctions, with the
first stage consisting of non-economic sanctions, the second halting
remittances from abroad, and the last being a near total embargo.'
64
Former President Jimmy Carter preempted this policy when he flew to
Pyongyang to meet with Kim I1 Sung amidst controversy. 165 Carter
triumphantly announced that he had the makings of an agreement and
criticized the Clinton administration's proposed sanctions as a "serious
mistake." 166 Carter's public disavowal of sanctions led to the diffusion of
the immediate crisis and the possibility of a diplomatic give-and-take.
167
In August 1994, North Korea announced its intentions to remain a
party to the NPT and to implement IAEA safeguards, 168 and the United
States extended a negative security guarantee to North Korea, assuring North
Korea that it would not use nuclear weapons against it.' 6 9 The subsequent
Geneva Agreed Framework committed a U.S.-led consortium to fund and
build two light water reactors, and supply North Korea with, heavy crude oil
until the light water reactors were completed. 170 In exchange, North Korea
agreed not to back out of various nonproliferation commitments, and both
countries agreed to open liaison offices in the other's capital and reduce
trade barriers. 171 Such an agreement, brought about by the United States'
willingness to give up its threat of multinational sanctions, illustrates the
161 OBERDORFER, supra note 136, at 318.
162 See Seoul Supports Beijing Plan To Ease North Korea Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1994, at A2.
163 John Darnton, Clinton Says That North Korea Can Still Avoid U.N. Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1994, at A16.
164 OBERDORFER, supra note 136, at 318.
"6 OBERDORFER, supra note 136, at 318.
166 id.
167 With Carter as the mediator, both Korean leaders, Kim I1 Sung and Kim Young-Sam, agreed to a
summit meeting. See id., supra note 136, at 333-34. In addition, North Korea and the United States
resumed high-level bilateral talks in July 1994. North Korea promised not to extract plutonium from the
fuel rods or refuel its five megawatt reactor, and agreed to allow IAEA inspectors at Yongbyon. Id. at 332.
However, due to Kim II Sung's sudden death in July 1994, the two-Korea summit was canceled and the
talks were postponed until August 1994. Id. at 343, 351.
'68 Agreed Statement Between the U.S.A and the D.P.R.K., Aug. 12, 1994, in DISARMING
STRANGERS, supra note 158, at 261.
169 Id.
170 Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, Oct. 21, 1994, U.S.-DPRK, 34 I.L.M. 604.
171 id. North Korea also agreed to discontinue construction on larger reactors and not reprocess the
spent fuel from the five megawatt Yongbyon reactor. Id.
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limited effectiveness of U.S. sanctions in resolving the 1993-94 nuclear
crisis.
D. The Use of Sanctions Should Be Discontinued
The United States should discontinue, or at the very least,
significantly reduce its economic sanctions against North Korea. Not only
are economic sanctions ineffective, but North Korea's 2003 withdrawal from
the NPT also necessitates a viable resolution of the crisis. The United States
could resolve this crisis through a strategy of engagement. Only after
making changes to its sanctions against North Korea and the country's
designation as a state supporter of terrorism, however, can the United States
seriously pursue such a strategy of engagement.
1. North Korea's 2003 Withdrawal from the NPT Necessitates a
Resolution of the Crisis
In October 2002, confronted with U.S. intelligence, 172 North Korean
officials admitted having a secret nuclear weapons program and possessing
"more powerful things as well," ostensibly to protect themselves from a
perceived U.S. threat. 173 North Korea also notified the United States that,
from its point of view, American delays in its implementation nullified the
1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. 174
The Bush administration called on North Korea to eliminate its
nuclear weapons program, comply with the NPT, and reiterated that the
United States would not tolerate North Korea's possession of WMD.
17 5
North Korea's press release in response to the American allegations and
actions stated that it was ready to negotiate the nuclear issue if the United
States recognized its sovereignty, assured North Korea of nonaggression,
and agreed not to hinder North Korea's economic development.
17 6
Reluctant to engage in talks, 177 the United States scrapped the 1994
Agreed Framework and ended its oil shipments. 178 American, South
172 David E. Sanger, North Korea Says It Has a Program on Nuclear Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2002, at Al.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Julia Preston, Threats and Responses: The Nuclear Crisis; North Korea Demands U.S. Agree to
Nonaression Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2002, at A8.
77 MICHAEL O'HANLON & MIKE MOCHIZUKI, CRISIS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: How TO DEAL
WITH A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA 15-16 (2003).
178 David E. Sanger, U.S. to Withdraw from Arms Accord with North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2002, at Sec. 1, 1.
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Korean, and Japanese officials threatened North Korea with grave
consequences, including the possibility of sanctions, unless North Korea
abandoned its nuclear program. 179  North Korea responded by expelling
IAEA inspectors, withdrawing from the NPT, and reprocessing spent nuclear
fuel rods.'
80
No progress has been made towards a resolution of the crisis. A need
for greater cooperation between the United States and its allies in forming a
coherent strategy continues. April 2003 negotiations mediated by China
produced no results. 181 Similarly, February 2004 six-party talks did not lead
to any real progress. 182 In June 2004, Japan and South Korea, with
American approval but not participation, offered North Korea a package of
energy and economic aid in exchange for terminating its nuclear program.
183
North Korea, however, has balked, demanding U.S. participation in
exchange for returning to six-party negotiations. 184 As no progress has been
made on resolving the crisis, the United States should try to engage North
Korea in meaningful negotiations by offering to consider ending economic
sanctions. 1
85
2. A Strategy of Engagement Supports the Ending of Sanctions
By ending sanctions, the United States can create goodwill and
political capital, which are particularly necessary because its enthusiasm for
179 David E. Sanger, Threats and Responses: The White House; Bush Aides Back Effort for UN
Denunciation of North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2002 at All. At the outbreak of the crisis, Japanese
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi commented that "[ilt is outrageous that North Korea would have nuclear
arms and weapons of mass destruction when its people are starving." James Brooke, Jolted by North
Korea, Japan Grows Angrier, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2002, at A6. In November 2003, the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization ("KEDO") formally suspended the Light-Water Reactor project agreed
to in the 1994 Agreed Framework. Press Release, Korean Economic Development Organization, KEDO
Executive Board Meeting, Nov. 21, 2003, available at http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewslD=25
(last visited Apr. 20, 2005). KEDO extended the suspension until December 2005. See Press Release,
Korean Economic Development Organization, KEDO Extends Suspension of LWR Project, Nov. 26, 2004,
available at http://www.kedo.org/news detail.asp?NewslD=29 (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
180 IAEA, supra note 160.
' ANDREW SCOBELL, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITuT, CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: FROM
COMRADES-IN-ARMS To ALLIES AT ARM'S LENGTH 10-11 (2004). The three-party talks were a
compromise between North Korea's insistence on bilateral talks with the United States and United States'
insistence on multilateral talks which would have also included Japan, South Korea, and Russia. Id.
182 Id.
1s3 Steven R. Weisman, Discord on North Korea as Powell Finishes East Asia Trip, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2004, at A9.
184 id.
185 This is particularly so because North Korea could interpret economic sanctions as a prelude to
war. See Sanctions on North Korea by U.S. Nired, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, available at
http:lwww.japantimes.co.jplcgi-binlgetarticle.pl5?nn20050119a3.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005)
(referencing statements U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon).
VOL. 14 No. 2
U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA
sanctions has not been shared by its Asian allies. It is important that the
United States has support for its policy from Japan, South Korea, and
China. 186 The United States should also hold out the possibility of
cooperation with North Korea, while taking a strong stance if North Korea
• • 187
continues to spurn the nonproliferation regime. Given the Bush
administration's propensity for unilateralism, 88 a good faith demonstration
of the United States' willingness to work with its allies is doubly important.
A hegemonic, unilateral, nonproliferation strategy is ineffective, and "no
nonproliferation policy can work if it is at odds with the interests of the very
countries it is designed to protect."'189
Assuming that peace and stability on the Korean peninsula are the
goals, the logical policy course for the United States is more engagement, 19°
particularly because it implicitly recognizes the importance of a nuclear
program to North Korea. 191 Collapse of the North Korean regime is
undesirable due to the instability and the economic costs which would
inevitably follow. 192 The United States should seek China's cooperation,
because China's security interests favor North Korea's continued, non-
nuclear existence. 93 Military conflict would not only put American troops
at China's doorstep, but could also trigger massive refugee inflows, affect
social stability, and panic foreign investors.
194
A key component of such an engagement policy is the retraction of
economic sanctions. Currently, North Korea has little to lose in its relations
with the United States, which may make it more willing to pursue a
116 Michael J. Mazarr, Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea, 20
INTL. SECURITY, 92, 106-07 (Autumn 1995).
:87 David M. Lampton, China: fed up with North Korea?, WASH. POST, June 4, 2003, at A27.
88 President George W. Bush's administration has demonstrated a unilateralist approach to foreign
policy. See Banning Garrett, The Post-September I'h Strategic Situation and its Implications for the
United States, China and Sino-American Relations, in U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION: A NEW PARADIGM OR CONTINUING MODALITIES 31 (Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, ed.
2003).
189 Mazarr, supra note 186, at 110.
190 C.S. Eliot Kang, North Korea's Security Policy: Swords into Plowshares?, in NORTH KOREA AND
NORTHEAST ASIA 209 (Samuel S. Kim & Tai Hwan Lee, ed. 2002).
19' Id. at 200.
:92 See Cha, supra note 136, at 220.
93 See David M. Lampton, China and the Crisis in Korea, IN THE NAT'L INTEREST, July 30, 2003,
available at http:/www.inthenationalinterest.com/ArticlesNol2lssue3ONol2lssue3Lampton.htm] (last
visited Apr. 20, 2005).
'9' DAVID M. LAMPTON & RICHARD DANIEL EWING, UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS IN A POST-
SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD 69 (2002). Regional security would help China ensure the vitality and stability of
its economy, especially as it is faced with keeping its unemployment levels, and worker discontent, down.
See, e.g. id. at 80; Andrew Browne, China Charts a Tight Course - Leaders Test New Tools for Controlling
a Hurtling Economy, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2004, at A18.
APRIL 2005
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
belligerent and damaging course of action. 95 Lifting economic sanctions
would not unduly reward North Korean bad behavior, but would give North
Korea a greater stake in a non-nuclear status quo.196 Ending sanctions could
help a militarily-inclined American administration achieve its objectives,
because engagement, more than containment, "better equips the hawk for
her desired objective."' 197
North Korea has long complained that the United States failed to
uphold its part of the Geneva Agreed Framework, particularly its promise to
normalize relations. 198 This slight, coupled with North Korean concerns
about its security and American hostility, may explain its motives in
continuing its nuclear program. North Korea has stated that the United
States must leave North Korea out of its "axis of evil," lift economic
sanctions, and annul the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 before
North Korea will participate in six-party talks. 99
Without appearing weak or conciliatory, the United States could lift
economic sanctions and build political capital with its allies in the process.
Ending economic sanctions imposes no real costs on the United States
because sanctions have not been effective, and the benefit of lifting the
sanctions as a symbolic gesture could be great.
V. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S OPENING OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA
CAN SERVE AS A MODEL FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH NORTH
KOREA
The United States has previously embarked on a bold international
relations experiment when it opened relations with China, an unfriendly,
communist country, in 1970. The United States' experience with China can
serve as a useful model for entering into an age of greater cooperation with
North Korea to prevent the proliferation of WMD.
195 See Cha, supra note 136, at 221-25.
196 See id. at 236.
197 Id.; Victor D. Cha, The Rationale for 'Enhanced' Engagement of North Korea: After the Perry
Policy Review, 39 ASIAN SURVEY 845, 861 (Nov.-Dec., 1999).
198 Doug Struck, For North Korea, U.S. is Violator of Accords; Mind-set helps Explain Pyongyang's
Actions, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2002, at A18.
199 Hae Won Choi, North Korea lists terms for U.S. to Resume Talks, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 3,
2004, at Al.
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A. Punitive U.S. Policies Sought to Isolate China
The United States refused to recognize the communist People's
Republic of China ("PRC") twenty years after it was formally established, 200
because the defeat of the American-supported Nationalists was a blow to
American power and prestige.201 Instead, popular anti-communist sentiment
in the United States reinforced the official American position that the
Nationalist government of Taiwan was the true representative of China.202 A
conservative, pro-Taiwan "China Lobby" helped shape these attitudes and
vigorously opposed trade with communist China.0 3 The PRC's support for
communist revolutions in Southeast Asia-and its role in the Vietnam War
in particular2--also frustrated the American policy of containment. 20 5 As a
result of the PRC's support for North Korea in the Korean War, the United
States imposed a complete trade embargo against the PRC, barred personal
imports from the PRC, and banned travel to mainland China.20 6 In addition,
the United States blocked China's admission to the United Nations.20 7
During this period, the United States pursued multilateral economic
sanctions against the PRC with limited success. 0 8 U.S. power in punishing
the PRC economically was limited because not all American allies followed
20921U.S. policies. Consequently, only limited UN sanctions were imposed.210
Although the embargo's effect on the Chinese economy was minimal, the
sanctions cost the United States political capital with its allies.211 The PRC's
200 The PRC was established in 1949. BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: CHINA (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgnl18902.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTE: CHINA]. The United States did not open relations
with the PRC until 1971, with diplomatic normalization not occurring until 1979. Id.
201 SHU GUANG ZHANG, ECONOMIC COLD WAR: AMERICA'S EMBARGO AGAINST CHINA AND THE
SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1949-1963 17 (2001).
202 JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE, CROSSING THE DIVIDE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF NORMALIZATION OF
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 7 (1997).
203 ZHANG, supra note 201, at 24. It should also be noted that public opinion was not in favor of
rapprochement with China. See HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 167 (1979).
204 See ZHANG, supra note 201, at 30.
205 Under containment, the United States deemed it necessary to keep peace while preserving the
balance of power by producing intangible assurances to democracies as well as tangible reinforcement. See
JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, WE Now KNOW: RETHINKING COLD WAR HISTORY 37-38 (1997).
206 HOLDRIDGE, supra note 202, at 7.
207 KISSINGER, supra note 203, at 719.
208 ZHANG, supra note 201, at 34-49.
20 Even the Consultative Group, a consortium of Western nations that imposed trade controls on
communist countries, did not favor economic sanctions against the PRC to the extent that the United States
did. ZHANG, supra note 201, at 139. The Consultative Group equalized the level of trade controls between
the PRC and the Eastern European bloc in 1955; the United States supported stronger controls against the
PRC. Id.
210 ZHANG, supra note 201, at 34-49.
233 See id. at 202.
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participation in the world economy during the 1960s was limited2 12 due to
the Great Leap Forward213 and Cultural Revolution 214 campaigns. In 1970,
China's total trade amounted to US $4.59 billion, a mere 0.7% of the global
economy. 215 However, the United States recognized that the PRC would
eventually become an economic power and needed to be engaged.2 16
The American policy shift towards engaging the PRC was predicated
217
on geopolitics and Cold War concerns. Nixon and National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger thought the United States could benefit from
having closer relations with both the Soviet Union and the PRC than the two
communist states shared with each other. 218 For about twenty years,
however, virtual isolation and ideological hostility dominated relations
between the United States and the PRC. 2 19 Following the purges of the
McCarthy era, policymakers viewed the PRC as a "brooding, chaotic,
fanatical, and alien realm difficult to comprehend and impossible to
sway.'22° Although there was talk of pursuing rapprochement with the PRC
in academic circles and Democrats supported such a move, 2 2 1 there was little
progress towards it. 222 In such a political and social environment, the
opening to China was a political coup for the Nixon administration and
transformed the structure of international politics.223
212 NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 2 (1994).
213 The basis of the Great Leap Forward was that China could rapidly develop through the
mobilization of the masses and turn labor into capital without much investment in technology. See
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 102-08 (1995).
However, roughly thirty million people starved to death and the Chinese economy went into a deep
depression as the agriculture sector collapsed and the Soviet Union cancelled its aid program to China. Id.
at 108.
214 Although Mao Zedong sought to renew China's revolutionary spirit, his Cultural Revolution threw
Chinese society into violent upheaval, destruction, and economic stagnation. See id. at 111-16.
215 id.
216 President Richard M. Nixon, Remarks to Midwestem News Media Executives Attending a
Briefin on Domestic Policy in Kansas City, Missouri, PUB. PAPERS 802, 805-06 (July 6, 1971).
See JAMES MANN, ABOUT FACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA
FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 13-14 (1999).
218 KISSINGER, supra note 203, at 712.
219 Id. at 165.
220 Id. at 685.
221 See, e.g., James C. Thomson, Jr., On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in
Bureaucratic Politics, 50 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 220 (1972) (reporting that the Department of State,
Lyndon B. Johnson administration, and several Democrats indicated an interest in easing tensions and
increasing interaction with China).
222 MANN, supra note 217, at 28-29.
223 KISSINGER, supra note 203, at 163.
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B. The Nixon Administration Boldly Signaled a Desire to Begin a
Strategic Partnership with China
As border clashes between China and the Soviet Union erupted along
the Ussuri River 224 in 1969, Kissinger speculated that the PRC might be
ready to reenter the diplomatic arena and soften its hostility towards the
United States. 225 Furthering this opportunity to exploit the Sino-Soviet split,
Henry Kissinger advocated a modification of the U.S. trade embargo against
the PRC due to this action's symbolic value.226 Accordingly, in 1969 the
State Department announced an easing of restrictions on trade and travel to
the PRC, one of several signals to Beijing indicating the administration's
desire to improve relations. 22 7  In this way, the United States began to
change its legal classification of the Chinese regime.
The low-level signals continued, and in 1970 correspondence
increased between the Nixon administration and the PRC.228 The United
States relaxed most of the official restrictions against travel to the PRC, as
well as further easing trade controls. 229 In his 1971 Foreign Policy Report to
Congress, Nixon noted that such measures were taken to indicate a desire to
establish a serious dialogue with the PRC.23° In addition to reducing travel
and trade restrictions, Nixon sought to stimulate greater U.S.-PRC
interaction by terminating controls on some non-strategic exports and
imports.231 In this manner, the United States' opening to China was
implemented through Nixon's broad use of his executive powers, without
much consultation with other branches of government or governmental
232
agencies.
224 The Ussuri River forms a considerable part of the border between Russia and China. Ussuri
River, BRITANNICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?tocld
=9381648&query=ussuri%20river&ct= (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
225 KISSINGER, supra note 203, at 177.
226 Id at 179 ("The time had come to modify our trade embargo against China. The actual change
was unimportant but the symbolism was vast.").
227 Id at 180-81. In a series of ad hoc decisions, the Nixon administration indicated its interest by
unilateral steps, intermediaries, and public declarations. See id at 182.
228 See id. at 182, 684-703.
229 RICHARD M. NIXON, THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON [hereinafter MEMOIRS OF RICHARD
NIXON] 545 (1978). See also KISSINGER, supra note 203, at 723.
230 President Richard M. Nixon, Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign
Policy, supra note 216, 219, 278 (Feb. 25, 1971).
231 See id. See also President Richard M. Nixon, Statement Announcing Changes in Trade and Travel
Restrictions With the People's Republic of China, supra note 216, 530, 530-31 (Apr. 14, 1971). President
Nixon announced, among other things, that visas for visitors from the PRC would be expedited, U.S.
currency controls would be relaxed, and that U.S. vessels could carry Chinese cargo between non-Chinese
ports.p 2 See, generally, ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 212-18 (1973) (arguing
that Nixon sought the consolidation of power in the executive branch of government). Kissinger, of course,
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Although public signaling was done by the Nixon administration,
most of the dialogue occurred through back-channel diplomacy and third-
country messengers-not through normal diplomatic and institutional
processes.233 Amidst much secrecy, Kissinger completed a 1970 visit to
Beijing, which paved the way for Nixon's 1972 trip,234 the subsequent
Shanghai Communiqu6 stating both parties' foreign policies,235 and the
normalization of relations in 1979.236 Such developments could not have
been possible if the Nixon administration had not signaled, through
increased contacts and reduced trade restrictions, its intention to improve
relations.
Prior to his assumption of the presidency, Nixon wrote in 1967 that
"we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of
nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its
neighbors. 237 Kissinger noted that what the PRC really wanted was not
exchange, recognition, or U.N. membership, but "strategic reassurance,
some easing of their nightmare of hostile encirclement., 238 The same can be
said of North Korea in 2005. Since its neighbors include South Korea and
Japan, close U.S. allies, North Korea is surrounded by hostile countries.
North Korea does not belong to many international organizations, 239 and
China's recent pressure on North Korea to change its weapons proliferation
programs 24° may exacerbate its feelings of isolation. With this in mind,
North Korea has repeatedly stated that it wants a guarantee that the United
States will not invade.241 As with China, the effective way of resolving the
participated extensively in the administration's China policy. See KISSINGER, supra note 203, at 163-94,
684-787.
233 See MANN, supra note 217, at 25-30. Through Pakistani and Romanian channels, Nixon and
Kissinger exchanged words of welcome and interest in high-level meetings with PRC leader Mao Zedong
and PRC Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. See THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON, supra note 229, at 546-47.
234 MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON, supra note 229, at 551-52.
235 See Text of Joint Communique Issued at Shanghai, Feb. 27, 1972, 66 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 435, 437-
38 (1972).
236 BACKGROUND NOTE: CHINA, supra note 200.
237 Richard Nixon, Asia After Viet Nam, 46 FOREIGN AFF. 111, 121 (1967).
231 KISSINGER, supra note 203, at 685.
239 North Korea is a member of the UN. UNITED NATIONS, List of Member States, available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). North Korea is not, however, a
member of the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. See NOLAND, supra note 68, at 58. It is also
not a member of the World Trade Organization. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Understanding the
WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers (2005), available at http://www.wto.org/englishi
thewtoe/whatis_e/tif-e/ org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
24°See SCOBELL, supra note 181, at 10-12.
241 See, e.g. Agreed Statement Between the U.S.A. and the D.P.R.K., Aug. 12, 1994, in DISARMING
STRANGERS, supra note 158 ("The U.S. is prepared to provide the D.P.R.K. with assurances against the
threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S."), at 261; Agreed Framework Between the United States of
America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Oct. 21, 1994, supra note 170 ("The U.S. will
provide formal assurances to the D.P.R.K. against he threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.");
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political crisis may be a bold change in foreign policy, beginning with the
delisting of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although North Korea was designated as a state supporter of terrorism
under the EAA, the subsequent economic sanctions imposed by the United
States against it have not been effective. Just as the Nixon administration's
opening to China, a previously closed and hostile country, paved the way for
a new U.S.-China relationship, 242 so too may the easing of economic
sanctions catapult U.S.-North Korean relations into a more cooperative era.
Given that the end of North Korea's listing as a state supporter of terrorism
will not impose a high economic cost on the United States but will engender
good will with North Korea and the United States' Asian allies, the United
States should end its sanctions against North Korea. Even if diplomacy
fails, pursuing a policy of engagement will give the United States the
political capital it needs to seek international action and approval for the use
of force.24' By ending North Korea's designation as a terrorist state,
therefore, the United States would not only lay a foundation for a greater
dialogue, but also help secure international support in case military force
244became necessary to achieve its objectives of a nuclear-free North Korea.
Preston, supra note 176. North Korea has stated that it is ready negotiate the nuclear issue if the United
States assures North Korea of nonaggression.
242 President Clinton termed the U.S.-China relationship a "strategic partnership," while President
George W. Bush has labeled China a "strategic competitor." See E.J. Dionne, Jr., China Policy Full of
Contradictions, DENVER POST, Apr. 10, 2001, available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/
dionne/20010410.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).243 Joel S. Wit, New Rules of Engagement with North Korea, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at A17.
244 See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, President and President Putin
Discuss Strong U.S.-Russian Partnership (Feb. 24, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/02/20050224-9.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
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